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This paper addresses three recent developments in historical sociology: (i) neo-Weberian 
historical sociology within International Relations; (ii) the „civilizational analysis‟ approach 
utilized by scholars of „multiple modernities‟, and (iii) the „third wave‟ cultural turn in US 
historical sociology. While these developments are responses to problems identified within 
earlier forms of historical sociology, it is suggested each fails to resolve them precisely 
because each remains contained within the methodological framework of historical sociology 
as initially conceived. It is argued that their common problem lies in the utilization of „ideal 
types‟ as the basis for socio-historical analysis. This necessarily has the effect of abstracting a 
set of particular relations from their wider connections and has the further effect of 
suggesting sui generis endogenous processes as integral to these relations. In this way, each of 
the three developments continues the Eurocentrism typical of earlier approaches. The paper 
concludes with a call for „connected histories‟ to provide a more adequate methodological 
and substantive basis for an historical sociology appropriate to calls for a properly global 





Historical sociology is primarily a subfield of sociology, although the claims made about it 
are frequently much grander. Most contributors have been sociologists who invoke 
historiographical arguments, although in recent years, it has been within the field of 
International Relations (IR)  at least in the United Kingdom (UK)  that historical 
sociology has perhaps had most resonance. In this section devoted to sociology and IR, I 
want to address some key developments within sociology that have had less attention within 
the field of IR and call into question some of its assumptions. I begin with one recent 
approach in IR that draws directly on historical sociology, before addressing two recent 
developments within historical sociology that have special resonance for debates within IR. 
These are: (i) the argument for a „new‟ neo-Weberian historical sociology within IR in the 
UK (Hobden and Hobson 2002; Lawson 2007); (ii) the largely European engagement with 
historical sociology that seeks to combine it with „civilizational analysis‟ in order to identify 
„multiple modernities‟ (Arnason 2000; Eisenstadt 2000b; 2001); and (iii) the „third wave‟ 
cultural turn in US historical sociology (for example, Bonnell and Hunt 1999b; Adams et al 
2005a). Each is a response to problems of earlier forms of historical sociology. The problem 
of locating agency is the focus of the first development; the deficiencies of a linear 
convergent model of development are the focus of the second; and the problem of structural 
determination is the focus for the third. I shall suggest, however, that each response fails to 
resolve these problems precisely because each remains contained within the methodological 
framework of historical sociology, as conceived within the position being subjected to 
critique. 
 A typical feature of historical sociology is that its methodological specificity rests in 
the utilization of „ideal types‟ as the basis for socio-historical analysis. This necessarily has the 
effect of abstracting a set of particular connections from wider connections and has the 
further effect of suggesting sui generis endogenous processes as integral to the connections 
that are so abstracted. The other connections most frequently omitted are those „connecting‟ 
Europe and the West to much of the rest of the world. These connections are thereby 
rendered exogenous to the processes abstracted from them at the same time as these 
processes are represented as having a significant degree of internal coherence, independent 
of these wider connections. In this way, a dominant Eurocentric focus to the analysis is 
established, while relegating non-European contributions to specific cultural inflections of 
pre-existing structures that are held to be a product of European modernity (Bhambra 
2007a).  
 While postcolonial criticism has sought to illuminate these omissions (see Guha 
1982; 1983; Chaturvedi 2000), it has itself frequently focused on the specificity of what is 
omitted in the standard accounts, rather than their interconnected and related nature. In 
other words, it also fails to see the connections as integral to the processes previously 
represented as independent of them. Of course, there are other approaches which purport to 
avoid some of these difficulties identified by postcolonial theorists. For example, Marxist 
approaches with their emphasis on „totality‟, whether „expressively‟ given or „conjuncturally‟ 
determined (to use Louis Althusser‟s (1969) formulation), would seem necessarily to be 
about connections (see for example, Rosenberg 2006; Matin 2007).  
The issue of Marxist approaches is further complicated by the division between self-
consciously „internalist‟ approaches (for example, Brenner 1976; 1977 and Wood 2002) and 
those which emphasize inter-societal inter-connection (for example, Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 
Teschke 2005; Rosenberg 2006; 2007). It should be clear, however, that a defining feature of 
any Marxist approach (precisely what distinguishes it from historical sociology) is the emphasis 
on modes of production and their determinate processes. The „internalism‟ of some Marxist 
approaches may be moderated by an emphasis upon „uneven and combined development‟, 
but the meaning of the latter is given in the central role attributed to the modes of 
production which render other processes (those of colonialism, for example) secondary to 
them, however empirically significant they are allowed to be. While historical materialist 
approaches acknowledge the operation of capitalism as a „world system‟, then, they usually 
also identify its central dynamic with processes having a European origin.  
Any model that posits a world historical centre from which developments diffuse 
outwards is problematic. What is needed is a „connected histories‟ approach within a de-
centred conception of „totality‟; de-centred not just spatially, but also conceptually, (that is, 
my ultimate concern would also be to de-centre the idea of „modes of production‟ in these 
debates).1 While I do regard Marxist historiographies to be similarly flawed to those of 
Weberian historical sociology, then, for the purposes of this paper I am using the self-
conscious distinction between „historical materialism‟ and „historical sociology‟ to delimit the 
                                               
1
 I shall be addressing the specific issues of Marxist historiography and its relation to historical 
sociology in a forthcoming paper, „Modernity in Global Context: Historical Sociology and the Marxist 
Problematique‟. 
 
object of my scrutiny. It will be evident by the end of this paper that I locate my own 
concerns within a reconstructed historical sociology, rather than historical materialism.  
 Before I begin my examination of the three recent developments identified above, I 
shall set out their context in „second wave‟ historical sociology. After I have outlined the 
problems inherent to each of these three critical responses to second wave historical 
sociology, I shall conclude with a call for „connected histories‟ to provide a more adequate 
methodological and substantive basis for an historical sociology appropriate for our times 
and for IR.  
 
 
Second wave historical sociology: a recent history 
 
Historical sociology came to be delineated in the post-war period and, in particular, in the 
aftermath of the tumultuous decade of the sixties. Even if one can see antecedents for it in 
the writings of the „classics‟ of the discipline, such as Karl Marx and Max Weber, its explicit 
statement is strongly associated with the general upheavals and critiques of disciplinary 
formations that the 1960s themselves came to represent (see Skocpol 1984a). The different 
academic groupings that began to coalesce around the idea of historical sociology in this 
period did so for the most part around „oblique attacks on orthodoxies in their disciplines‟ 
(Abbott 1991, 202). In sociology, the orthodoxy was Parsonsian functionalism, embodied in 
the tropes of grand theory, where societal types were derived from a theoretical scheme 
rather than in a direct address of the historical record. The critical response challenged the 
abstract Parsonsian focus on consensus and integration and instead saw social change as 
characterized by conflict and struggle (see Moore 1966; Tilly 1985a; 1988; Skocpol 1984a; 
1987; Abbott 1991; Holmwood 1996). Correspondingly, in history there was a widening of 
the remit of historical investigation which increasingly operated under the rubric of social 
history or „histories from below‟ (see Hobsbawm 1971; Sarkar 1985; Zunz 1985).2 In turn, 
this reinforced the concern within historical sociology for mechanisms of change that 
emphasized popular struggles and social movements, rather than the unfolding of a 
functionalist logic of „structural differentiation‟ (Stedman-Jones 1976; Skocpol 1987; Tilly 
1985b; 1988).  
 The association of historical sociology with social and political movements was also 
to become a distinctive aspect of second wave historical sociology. While Andrew Abbott 
(1991) points to Marxism and feminism as particular analytical approaches within historical 
sociology, I suggest that ultimately their contribution lies in pointing to the structures of value 
relevance in the constitution of disciplines. This is disguised to some extent by the 
circumstance that the points at which history and sociology moved closer to each other and 
began to coalesce around the idea of historical sociology were precisely those in which 
historians and sociologists had shared political commitments. Over time, these commitments 
have fragmented and the mood for grand theory within sociology has declined, opening up 
the field to a more „disruptive‟ politics of knowledge construction.   
 The distance of the second wave historical sociologists from the Parsonsian 
approach lay in their accounts of the mechanisms producing European (and north 
American) dominance and whether there was some social formation beyond the „new lead 
                                               
2  It was not until the emergence of the Subaltern Studies collective in the 1980s, however, that the 
priority given to the labour movements of advanced capitalist countries was significantly challenged. See for 
example, Guha (1982; 1983) and Arnold (1984). 
society‟ (Parsons 1971) of American capitalism, that is, they were not generally critical of the 
idea of an endogenous process of modernization within Europe. As Theda Skocpol suggests 
when outlining „emerging agendas‟ in historical sociology, it is the issue of „evidence and 
methods of analysis‟ that distinguish current historical sociologists from earlier ones, not 
necessarily the „traditional questions about the roots and consequences of the European 
Industrial Revolution‟ (Skocpol 1984b, 357, emphasis added). Where historical sociology has 
broken with „the Western Eurocentric purview‟, it has apparently done so by pursuing „in-
depth historical comparisons among non-Western countries or people examined in their own 
right’ (Skocpol 1984b, 358, emphasis added), thereby suggesting that European 
modernization is appropriately studied in „its own right‟.  
 Where the mediation of history by theory has made it necessary to ask the question 
posed by Victoria Bonnell „how do historical sociologists select, organize, and interpret 
historical evidence?‟ (Bonnell 1980, 162)  the answer has, for the most part, been 
comparative study. For, as Bonnell continues, comparative study is the primary way of 
establishing that „a theoretical proposition applicable to one case sustains its explanatory 
power when applied to additional cases‟ (1980, 160; see also Skocpol and Somers 1980). 
However, the issue is not merely that of the selection of cases to be compared, but also the 
primary point of view from which comparison is made. That is, what kinds of historical 
circumstances are held to merit inclusion within the generalized statements and which are to 
be aligned with mere particularity? Here we can see quite explicitly that the dominant case 
for historical sociologists remains that of the emergence of an endogenous European 
(Western) modernity and then, its subsequent world-historical significance. While the 
experiences of others may now be examined in their own right, usually in terms of providing 
different routes to modernity, they are not deemed as significant in the answering of the 
„traditional‟ questions of modernity, nor calling into question the validity of those questions.  
 Abbott (1991, 228) is sceptical about the potential of comparative study to deliver on 
its promise to provide adequate explanations of social change, arguing that the focus on 
generating causal explanations diverts attention away from the basic social scientific insight 
that „the meaning of an event is determined by the story in which it appears and by the 
ensemble of contemporaneous events‟. In this he agrees with Philip Abrams who writes that 
in sociology, the narrative of becoming „is both the reality to be explained and the 
structuring in terms of which explanation can be achieved‟ (1980, 11). Stories need to be 
validated not by recourse to facts alone, suggests Abrams, „but by a reasoned elaboration of 
the grounds of principle in terms of which their facts are selected, constructed and judged 
significant‟ (1980, 12). The focus on generalization by way of narrative, for both Abbott and 
Abrams, follows in the Weberian tradition of placing complex particulars  that is, 
descriptions  at the centre of analyses from which ideal-typical narratives can then be 
constructed (see Kalberg 1994). The construction of these ideal-typical narratives becomes 
the primary focus of historical sociology where the emphasis is on „agency‟, rather than 
„structures‟, or only those structures that can be „uncovered‟ in actors‟ meanings. The issue of 
„comparison‟, then, for Abrams and Abbott, cannot be limited within a self-contained 
theoretical framework as the „possession‟ of the individual sociologist or historian, but is also 
dependent upon the wider social and cultural context within which knowledge is produced 
(see Nelson 1993). For a long time that context  the nature of the academy, prevailing 
cultural meanings, and so forth  supported Eurocentric narratives. However, as soon as 
narrative becomes the explicit focus, space is created for the possibility of different 
narratives and thus, the potential for displacing the dominant Eurocentric narrative.  
 
 
Third wave historical sociology in the UK, Europe and the US 
 
The second wave project of historical sociology, as it came to be delineated in the 1960s, 
entailed little direct consideration of the politics of knowledge production, or in Weber‟s 
terms, value relevance. Yet, as I have suggested, subsequent developments in sociology have 
challenged grand theory more fundamentally as a modernist project that could no longer be 
sustained in the light of various kinds of postmodern and poststructuralist critiques. In their 
different ways, these criticisms all focus on the issue of agency. Frequently, this has been 
conducted in terms of some kind of standpoint position arising from feminist and 
postcolonial criticisms, or, more generally, in the context of a self-proclaimed cultural turn  
itself influenced by those criticisms. In many respects, the recent developments in historical 
sociology which I shall address in the rest of this article represent an attempt to reengage 
with the established tropes of historical sociology in light of these critiques rather than 
transforming them. In part, the problem of these critiques is seen as one of relativism where 
the issue is how to accommodate difference to the „general‟ categories of the dominant 
scheme since it is only general categories that could establish that different variants, say of 
modernity, are indeed variants of the „same‟ thing.   
 
Historical sociology and UK International Relations  
 
The recent engagement of IR theorists with historical sociology has been regarded as a novel 
undertaking by much of mainstream IR, which, it is argued, remains „curiously unhistorical‟ 
in its approach (Lawson 2007, 346). The relatively recent  and perhaps fleeting  
dominance of systems theories and rational choice approaches such as neo-realism, however, 
is prefaced by a longer-standing engagement with the disciplines of history and sociology. A 
key argument made by Stephen Hobden is that the recent engagement is not a new 
phenomenon, but that rather it is part of „a long and distinguished tradition‟ (Hobden 2002, 
42; see also Hobden 1998). Indeed, some of the key authors within the field have crossed 
these disciplinary boundaries at some point in their career (for example, Michael Mann and 
Martin Shaw). What is perhaps distinctive is the explicit engagement with „historical 
sociology‟, as opposed to simply with „history‟ and „sociology‟. As Hobden (2002) and John 
M Hobson (2002) argue, the 1980s were marked by the convergence of the concerns of 
(some) second wave historical sociologists and (some) IR theorists on questions of state 
formation, interstate relations and the emergence and development of global processes 
generally. To the extent that historical sociologists expanded the remit of sociology to 
include an active engagement with understanding global and international processes „their 
work provided challenges to both sociology and International Relations‟ (Hobden 2002, 57).  
 While IR theorists have looked to historical sociology to remedy particular 
deficiencies within their own discipline, Hobson suggests that the turn to an avowedly 
Weberian historical sociology has potentially replicated those deficiencies. He argues this is 
because both mainstream forms of IR, as well as historical sociologists, reify international 
structures and deny agency to state-society complexes (Hobson 2002, 66; see also Rosenberg 
2007). In contrast, Hobson calls for a reformulation of historical sociology  to be termed 
„second wave Weberian historical sociology‟3 or „neo-Weberian historical sociology‟   
organized in line with „a structurationist theory of the state and International Relations in 
which states and state-society complexes shape, and are simultaneously shaped by, the 
international system‟ (Hobson 2002, 66). Quite apart from this being very similar to what 
neo-Weberian sociologists, such as Skocpol have argued, it also replicates other aspects of 
debates internal to historical sociology along the same lines.  
 Indeed, what Hobson describes is not so much neo-Weberian as neo-functionalist. 
For example, he draws on Anthony Giddens‟ structuration theory as a resolution of the 
structure-agency dilemma, but this involves a codification of structural categories in terms of 
four structural principles that provide the „grid‟ through which institutions can be classified. 
Thus, Giddens writes of structuration analysis providing two forms of articulation, where: 
 
one is how far a society contains distinct spheres of „specialism‟ in respect of institutional 
orders: differentiated forms of symbolic order ... a differentiated „polity‟, „economy‟ and 
legal/ repressive apparatus. The second is how modes of institutional articulation are 
organized in terms of overall properties of societal reproduction: that is to say, „structural 
principles‟ (1981, 47 48) 
 
These reproduce the form of Talcott Parsons‟ account of structural differentiation, which 
historical sociologists had otherwise castigated (for a fuller discussion, see Holmwood 1996). 
This is in contrast to the development of a more distinctive neo-Weberian form of historical 
sociology, as discussed above, which would emphasize narrative over „causal structures‟.  
 Despite the call for a specifically neo-Weberian historical sociology within IR, this 
has not necessarily been picked up by other scholars, even those sympathetic to establishing 
a historical sociological method within IR. As Shaw argues, „the sociological imagination is 
intrinsically historical‟ and that this is „a common inheritance of sociology‟ not to be 
monopolized by any one school, be it Marxist, Weberian or other (2002, 84). Andrew 
Linklater (2002) similarly argues for a broadening out of the sociological field with which IR, 
and specifically historically oriented IR theorists engage; and Barry Buzan and Richard Little 
(2001; 2002) argue for methodological pluralism. Christian Reus-Smit, in turn, argues more 
strongly against the „subterranean rationalism and materialism‟ of the neo-Weberian 
approach in favour of a „constructivist turn‟ that draws on poststructuralist theory, seeing 
actors and action „as the products of institutionally grounded identities and normatively 
sanctioned repertoires of conduct‟ (Reus-Smit 2002, 121,129; see also Smith 2002). Despite 
these apparent differences, however, the authors mentioned are all convinced of the 
importance and perhaps even necessity of a historical sociological approach to IR that goes 
beyond the presentism of much IR literature.  
 The importance of historical sociology across the different positions in IR rests, in 
part, on resolving a supposed structure-agency problem and in acknowledging the 
importance of the cultural domain in the address of current silences. Remedying the 
previous omission of the rest of the world from global analyses is to be undertaken by 
„adding‟ particularities in the development of a „thick‟ conception of the social. For example, 
Hobden and Hobson, in their articulation of a „world historical sociology‟, suggest that the 
omission of postcolonial issues is to be rectified via a focus on the analysis of identity 
                                               
3 While historical sociologists within sociology generally term the work of Skocpol, Charles Tilly, and 
Mann and others as constituting „second wave historical sociology‟, the convention within IR is to term it, „first 
wave Weberian historical sociology‟. This is as a consequence of it being regarded as the first wave of historical 
sociology within IR, the ostensible focus of their engagement and critique. 
formation (Hobden and Hobson 2002, 284; see also Hobson 2007a). There is no 
acknowledgement of the necessity of reconsidering the structures of historical sociology that 
have previously excluded these „others‟. I would argue that it is the extent to which questions 
of difference and identity are taken simply to inflect the structural form of the system, as 
opposed to being understood as constitutive of that system, which poses fundamental 
limitations for properly historical sociological projects (see Holmwood 1996; 2001). These 
issues are also to be found within the „multiple modernities‟ approach to historical sociology. 
 
Multiple modernities, civilizational analysis and European historical sociology 
 
The second recent development within historical sociology is the conjunction between a 
Weberian comparative sociology of cultures with Jaspers‟ (1965) work on the emergence of 
Axial Age civilizations.4 This approach has been taken up, most prominently, by historical 
sociologists working on multiple modernities to examine the trajectory of modernity into 
divergent forms.5 Fundamental to this initiative is a concern with identifying the form of 
modernity associated with the West and then examining the cultural dynamics of other 
religions and/or civilizations in comparison to it. The civilizational approach provides a unit 
of analysis larger than that of the nation state while at the same time not subsuming the 
diversity of the world under a single rubric as was believed to be the case for earlier, 
functionalist modernization theory. Whereas modernization studies were tied, to a large 
extent, to the political and economic developments of the modern state, the new paradigm 
of multiple modernities brings in an important cultural focus in its attempt to move beyond 
the deficiencies of the earlier paradigm. It allows scholars to theorize differences between 
peoples and acknowledges the existence of a plurality of civilizations that goes beyond earlier 
binaries of „civilized‟ and „non-civilized‟, modernity and tradition. Key proponents of this 
historical sociological shift are, largely, European sociologists such as Johann Arnason 
(2000), Bjorn Wittrock (1998) and Goran Therborn (2003), who build on the work of 
Shmuel Eisenstadt (1965; 2000a; 2000b) and rework it in conjunction with him to examine 
processes of modernization in relation to civilizational complexes that bring culture „back in‟ 
to historical-sociological theorizing. 
 Theorists of multiple modernities situate themselves critically in relation to earlier 
debates on modernization theory as well as taking issue with the general charge of 
Eurocentrism made within postcolonial studies. In developing the multiple modernities 
paradigm, and in guarding against the self-identified fallacies of Eurocentrism and linear 
convergence, they claim to take into account the cultural diversity of the expression of 
modern institutions globally. Their move from a conceptual language of modernization to 
that of multiple modernities reflects unease with the idea of a singular, uniform trajectory 
applied to the current diversity of contemporary societies within the world. As Eisenstadt 
and Wolfgang Schluchter suggest, the global expansion of modernity ought not to be viewed 
„as a process of repetition but as the crystallization of new civilizations‟, albeit new 
civilizations that take as their reference point „the original Western crystallization of 
modernity‟ (1998, 2, 3). However, to the extent that these multiple modernities continue to 
                                               
4 See for example, the issue of International Sociology on „Rethinking Civilizational Analysis‟ (2001). 
There has also been a turn in IR to an international historical sociological approach (Hobson and Lawson 
2008), which engages with recent developments in „world history‟ (see for example, Buzan and Little 2001; Hall 
and Jackson 2007). 
5 See for example, the two volumes of Daedalus on „Early Modernities‟ (1998) and „Multiple 
Modernities‟ (2000). 
be understood as derived from the creative appropriation, by those that followed, of the 
institutional frameworks of modernity that are seen to originate in Europe, the problem of 
Eurocentrism remains integral to this new paradigm.  
 Modernity is theorized simultaneously in terms of its institutional constellations, that 
is, its tendency „towards universal structural, institutional, and cultural frameworks‟ 
(Eisenstadt and Schluchter 1998, 3), as well as a cultural programme „beset by internal 
antinomies and contradictions, giving rise to continual critical discourse and political 
contestations‟ (Eisenstadt 2000a, 7). Multiple modernities are thus seen to emerge from the 
encounters „between Western modernity and the cultural traditions and historical 
experiences‟ of other societies (Eisenstadt 2000a, 23). This explains the apparent paradox 
that Eisenstadt and Schluchter can dissociate themselves from Eurocentrism at the same 
time as apparently embracing its core assumptions, namely, „the Enlightenment assumptions 
of the centrality of a Eurocentred type of modernity‟ (1998, 5). Insofar as the civilization of 
modernity is seen to entail the modernity of civilizations and however differently other 
civilizations may then express „their‟ modernity, there is a clear understanding of Western 
modernity as the original form. Further, it is a form that is seen to have achieved expression 
without relation to others in order to produce modernity‟s common framework of 
institutions such as the market economy, the modern nation-state and bureaucratic 
rationality. These institutions, having originated in Europe, are then subsequently exported 
to the rest of the world where they are inflected within different cultural meanings. 
Colonialism is neither seen as integral to the construction of modern institutions nor, even 
within the diffusionist account given, seen as a mechanism of diffusion. 
 As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere, acknowledging the multiplicity of 
cultural forms of modernity does nothing to address the fundamental problems with the 
conceptualization of modernity itself (Bhambra 2007a). All that the idea of „multiple 
modernities‟ does, as Dirlik argues, is „contain challenges to modernity by conceding the 
possibility of culturally different ways of being modern‟ (Dirlik 2003, 285). There is no 
examination of what could be learnt from „our‟ engagements with „them‟ and how we might 
reconstruct our categories of understanding as a result of the new knowledge gained. Thus, 
while purporting to offer new ways of understanding the concept of modernity, theories of 
multiple modernities continue to rest on assumptions of an original modernity of the West 
which others adapt, domesticate, or tropicalize; the „originality‟ of the West as having been 
constituted in colonial relations is not addressed. These issues will be picked up and 
developed further in the concluding section of the article. Before presenting the idea of 
„connected histories‟ as a solution to these problems, I shall address the third recent 
development in historical sociology, which I suggest gives rise to „disaggregated‟, „decentred‟ 
histories. 
 
The cultural turn in US historical sociology 
 
The cultural turn in sociology, as in other disciplines, is predicated on the presumed 
necessary demise of grand narratives as well as a corresponding assertion of the importance 
and significance of the particular. The importance of discourse and representation is posited 
over that of adequate explanation, with explanation itself seen as part of the matrix of 
domination wittingly or unwittingly perpetuated by the social sciences. As Victoria E Bonnell 
and Lynn Hunt argue, for example, the cultural turn has led to the diminishing importance 
of causal explanation in favour of „the demystification and deconstruction of power‟ 
(Bonnell and Hunt 1999a, 11), including the power intrinsic to knowledge claims. This turn, 
then, owes much to the general crisis of the humanities, as embodied in the critique and 
politicization of knowledge as articulated in poststructuralist and postmodernist theories. It 
has also begun to permeate the area of historical sociology, at least in its north American 
variant, if not more generally.  
 Julia Adams, Elisabeth S Clemens and Ann Shola Orloff (2005a) draw together a 
variety of scholars who all engage, to a lesser or greater degree, with the project of critiquing 
and reconstructing „the modernist categories that have informed historical sociology to date‟ 
from the perspective of a self-consciously defined „third wave‟ of historical sociology 
(Adams et al 2005b, 3; see also Bonnell and Hunt 1999b). The editors argue that if the first 
wave of historical sociologists „were obsessed with how their world (usually Europe) had 
become modern, many of their [second wave] successors froze the distinction between 
tradition and modernity and concentrated their efforts almost exclusively on “modern 
society”‟ (Adams et al 2005b, 4). The „third wave‟ is defined, at least in part, by the idea that 
modernity needs to be historicized as an idea „capturing people‟s changing ideas of what is or 
is not modern, and assessing the valences of emotion and moral judgment that these 
mappings assume in varieties of discourse and institutions‟ (Adams et al 2005b, 15). In this 
way, the contributors seek to maintain a focus on large-scale transformations while 
simultaneously examining the diverse, complex histories that are regarded as embodying and 
constituting those transformations. 
 Briefly, the move away from earlier questions concerning structural determinism and 
causal explanation to the general „genealogical‟ project „associated with the formation of 
historically evolving cultural categories and practices‟ in Adams et al (2005a) is reinforced by 
related developments that foreground agency. The foci of third wave historical sociology are 
identified by the editors as the following: „(1) institutionalism, (2) rational choice, (3) the 
cultural turn, (4) feminist challenges, and (5) the scholarship on colonialism and the racial 
formations of empire‟ (Adams et al 2005b, 32).6 To the extent that these relate to questions 
of identity, identity is seen in the Foucauldian terms of the emergence and construction of 
the self-authorized individual subject. As such, they suggest that the silences of first and 
second wave historical sociology are to be probed in the context of understanding the 
emergence and historical conditions of particular identities in relation to the evolution of 
cultural categories and practices.  
 The structuralist sensibilities of second wave historical sociology and its associated 
problems are thus deemed to have been superseded by the focus on agency and cultural 
constructivism that now distinguishes third wave historical sociology. However, it is worth 
noting in passing that the categories remain unchanged and it is simply the emphasis that has 
shifted. While the turn to the particular is now located in the cultural realm, a decade earlier 
Abbott (1991) located similar particularistic tendencies within historical sociology, albeit in 
the social sphere. Abbott pointed specifically to links between history and sociology within 
„substantive areas like demography, studies of the family, labour history, criminology, and so 
on‟ (1991, 222). While history and sociology might each have been enriched by movements 
across the boundaries at these particular sites, each discipline remained internally diverse and 
immune to any fundamental reorientation as a consequence of the engagement. What was 
created was less an overarching historical sociology, as a number of historical sociologies, 
with the implication that these might be mutually exclusive. In a similar vein, I would argue 
                                               
6 In this way, „the cultural turn‟ is argued to be one of a number of related, but sometimes opposed, 
developments which have each displaced the dominant (structuralist) approach to historical sociology. In what 
follows, I concentrate on those aspects specifically associated with the cultural turn. 
third wave historical sociology is less a culturally inflected historical sociology than a form of 
historical cultural studies, which evades the difficult questions raised in its problematization 
of grand narratives through a descent into relativistic multiplicity. The failure to resolve the 
core questions associated with the grand narrative of (European) modernity has tended to 
devolve into a particularistic emphasis more attuned to the conventional modes of working 
in history. In this way, we are offered a diversity of disaggregated histories in which 
Eurocentric history is de-centred. However, this leaves the standard Eurocentric (macro) 
narrative intact in its own „particular‟ domain and fails to make the interconnections among 
those histories a specific focus of attention. 
 
 
From disaggregated to connected histories  
 
Two key related issues emerge from this consideration of developments within IR and 
within historical sociology more generally. The first is that „culture‟ is posited as something 
that can accommodate (agent produced) „difference‟, while at the same time allowing for the 
necessity of „material realities‟. This construction allows the presentation of the position that 
there are common structural institutions, which emerged in Europe and then were culturally 
inflected as they were diffused around the globe. As I have shown, these arguments are 
associated with another issue  that of the structure-agency debate where certain structural 
processes are said to allow mediation by cultural differences and particularity. Neo-Weberian 
IR historical sociology, for example, points to the lack of recognition of state (and other) 
agency within classical IR theory and the replication of this failure to address agency in 
second wave historical sociology‟s turn to IR. US historical sociology, in turn, seeks to 
relocate „agency‟ within its narratives of modernity by foregrounding the role of emotions 
and subjectivity. In a slightly different version of the debate, European civilizational 
historical sociology addresses the problem of structural determinism by acknowledging the 
plural cultural inflections of particular structural institutions. Here, resolving the tension 
between structure and agency is seen to be a solution to the problems presented by 
modernity rather than, as I propose, the expression and embodiment of those problems. All 
three contemporary forms of historical sociology, in some way posit culture (and the turn to 
culture) to address what are recognized as earlier deficiencies. In this way, an area of 
apparent convergence with postcolonial studies is also opened up, since the latter is 
frequently acknowledged as pointing to the necessity of recognizing cultural differences in 
other (non-European) parts of the world. The introduction of „culture‟ into these debates, 
however, is not unproblematic. Even if one were to accept the diffusionist position 
associated with the multiple modernities position, for example, there is no address of the 
processes by way of which these institutions had been diffused, that is, processes of 
colonialism, imperialism and slavery. Indeed, most explanations of dissemination or 
diffusion of what are regarded as „European‟ institutions elide the questions of colonialism 
and imperialism to a neutral process whereby European developments are said, as Peter 
Wagner puts it (2008, 43), not to have remained „confined to the territory of Europe‟; to 
have been simply spread around the world with little discussion of the processes by which 
such dissemination occurred. Further, the differences that are now beginning to be 
acknowledged in the recognition of culture (and cultural particularities) do not then call into 
question the pre-existing notions of „material realities‟, nor do they provide the basis from 
which to reconstruct our understandings of those „realities‟.  
 One of the key omissions highlighted across all three variants of contemporary 
historical sociology concerns the exclusion of „the rest of the world‟ from standard accounts 
of modernity and global processes. We can get some purchase on this by considering the 
historian Margaret C Jacob‟s argument in the context of science studies (but with a more 
general applicability) that there is a need to think globally and comparatively in our research 
as „there is now a global conversation under way in almost every area of inquiry‟ (Jacob 1999, 
112). The necessity of including „others‟ in our research today for Jacob is that while modern 
science was „[d]istinctively Western at its inception‟, it no longer is in its pursuit or execution 
(Jacob 1999, 95). While acknowledging the contemporary interconnectedness of global 
processes as they relate to the development of science, she is still reluctant to think that 
interconnectedness back through history despite the extensive literature in this field that 
presents interconnectedness as the prior condition of those processes argued to be indicative 
of emergent modernity (for an overview, see Barkawi 2004; Hobson 2004; Bhambra 2007a). 
Similarly, Michael Mann claims that „it was in England that major scientific and technological 
breakthroughs were made in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries‟ resulting in the 
only „spontaneous‟, that is, freestanding breakthrough to industrial society. This is why, he 
suggests, „the term “European Miracle” remains appropriate‟ (Mann 2006, 549). The reasons 
for the take-off in Europe are all attributed to developments within its geographical 
boundaries and there is little discussion within his account of the vital contribution of the 
slave trade, slavery, or colonial relations to these developments and processes.7 Despite the 
existence of an extensive historical and sociological literature addressing these very 
connections, Mann continues to argue for the self-contained emergence and development of 
the industrial revolution with little acknowledgement of the wider global conditions from 
which this largely endogenous account is built (for an overview, see Washbrook 1997; 
Bhambra 2007a). As such, industrialization continues to be regarded as a European 
phenomenon subsequently diffused to the rest of the world rather than one which was 
global in its instantiation and which had differential impacts across the globe. 
 The trail laid by Weber in seeking to determine the causes of the „Rise of West‟ and 
„the European miracle‟ has been followed by subsequent theorists attempting to account for 
the miracle in Europe, that is, the initial emergence of (the institutions of) modernity there 
(see Daedalus 1998; 2000). Reflecting on whether this understanding makes his work 
„Eurocentric‟, Mann argues that while he is „exploring what is uniquely European‟ (2006, 
550), he does not accept the claim regarding the general superiority of Europe as made by 
authors such as David Landes (1999).8 While the explicit interpretive bias linking the 
emergence of the miracle of modernity in Europe to an innate sense of superiority may be 
rejected by contemporary scholars such as Jacob and Mann, the exceptionalism of the West 
                                               
7 Despite the differences of emphasis and interpretation allowed to the various aspects of the 
„transition‟ to capitalism, for example, the overarching singularity of the process described—the expansion 
globally from an initial core that is European—is agreed upon in both standard accounts of industrialization as 
well the different Marxist ones (see, for example, Wallerstein 1979; Wood 2002). Any logic of industrialism or 
capitalism that can be isolated has been demonstrated to have existed in other places and at other times and so 
can never be regarded as unique nor causal in itself. The question is not one of the efficiency of, for example, 
Indian manufacture, but the colonial squeeze applied to it in order to privilege British interests. The one aspect 
that is missing from hegemonic explanations, then, is that of the relationship between any industrializing 
impulse and the ability to use „force‟ both in terms of establishing forms of „unfree‟ labour as well as expanding 
the reach of the market for one‟s goods. Colonialism was integral to both (for further details, see Bhambra 
2007a; on the issue of „force‟, see Barkawi 2004, 158). 
8 See Hobson (2007b) for a discussion of the ways in which even critical IR theory is implicated in 
particular Eurocentric constructions. 
as a „factual‟ matter  that is, as something that needs explanation in its own terms  remains 
firmly in place. Despite the extensive literature calling into question the sociological and 
historical boundaries of the „material realities‟ which are argued to pre-exist the subsequent 
inflection by cultural processes located in other parts of the world, historical sociology has, 
for the most part, failed to address its core questions in light of the reconstruction of these 
„material realities‟. 
 The comparative approach, which is advanced by all three responses to second wave 
historical sociology (as well as by second wave historical sociology itself), is established 
through a methodology of „ideal types‟ where different civilizational trajectories are 
examined in relation with each other or, more usually, with Europe, or the West. The ideal 
type of Western modernity, derived from an endogenous examination of Western history, 
continues to serve as the „universal‟ denominator against which to analyze and compare the 
developments and processes of, and in, other parts of the world. While „ideal types‟ are said 
to refer to the „real‟, they are posited as conceptual „truths‟ abstracted from any particular 
history and/or cultural location. This abstraction is designed to render certain connections 
„visible‟ and capable of being submitted to systematic examination. What is neglected is the 
extent to which that systematic examination reinforces the „invisibility‟ of other connections 
that might have been the object of investigation. The cultural turn simply „discovers‟ new 
particularities which are additive to the standard accounts. What is generally rendered 
invisible in most considerations of modernity are the colonial relationships which have 
comprised a significant aspect of modernity from its inception and have been no less 
systematic than the interconnections that have otherwise been represented within those 
accounts (see Bhambra 2007a; 2007b).  
 Colonialism, to the extent that it is addressed in the work of third wave historical 
sociologists, is seen as a phenomenon subsequent to modernity rather than constitutive of it. 
The various discourses of modernity, for example, from modernization theory to multiple 
modernities to entangled and alternative modernities, are variations on a theme where the 
theme is always the necessary priority of Europe, or the West, in any understanding of the 
world. „Others‟ enter into the narrative only after modernity is established in Europe. The 
„ideal type‟ of Western modernity is then supplemented by „ideal types‟ of other modernities 
drawing upon the disaggregated histories advocated by theorists of the cultural turn. While 
the cultural turn, and its explicit focus on narrative, might have encouraged sociologists to 
reconsider the general historical „narrative‟ of modernity implicit in the core categories of the 
discipline, it appears as if it has, rather, encouraged the proliferation of many, potentially 
mutually exclusive, narratives. What is rarely recognized is the way in which the „macro-
narrative‟ within which these particular narratives rest, remains unchanged.  
 Where the conceptual categories of historical sociology are dependent on a particular 
historical narrative, but have been argued to be timeless, or universal, in character, I suggest 
that they embody a form of unacknowledged Eurocentrism carried in the very methodology 
of comparative analysis. The evidential basis for this historical narrative within sociological 
discourse is reinforced in terms of the connections studied and those which are ignored, but 
this failure to consider „others‟ is not a failure of any individual theorist, rather it is a 
consequence of the methodological tools utilized: ideal types and comparative analysis. 
Where ideal types have been constructed in relation to particular narratives, we now need a 
new narrative and method for global historical sociology; this is a narrative of 
interconnection and a methodology of „connected histories‟ or, as Tarak Barkawi (2004) 
argues, „international interconnectedness‟. The narratives of interconnection  coming 
primarily from the turn to global and postcolonial histories  should thus pose significant 
problems for the macro assumptions of sociology, as well as provoking a reconsideration of 
the very organization of historical sociology.  
 In the area of security studies, Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey argue that the 
differentiation of the general (usually understood in terms of the „great powers‟) from local 
factors privileged by area studies is problematic for generating adequate explanations of 
complex phenomenon. They argue instead for the recognition of the „mutually constitutive 
character of world politics‟ through the analysis of „events, developments and processes in 
core and periphery together‟ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 348, 349). As Sanjay Subrahmanyam 
(1997) has similarly argued, the perceived „gap‟ between general historical frameworks and 
the particular experiences they ignore can be overcome by addressing difference in the 
context of „connected histories‟. The dominant sociological abstraction whereby categories 
are presented as universal while at the same time regarded as emanating from particular, 
discrete entities disguises two „truths‟ which require address. First, that „ideal types‟ are 
constructed in relation to a particular history and particular cultural engagements; and 
second, that in their construction, ideal types are abstracted from wider connections, which 
are themselves significant. In making an argument for „connected histories‟, Subrahmanyam 
provides an innovative and productive way out of the bind that sees much historical 
sociology caught between an evolutionary universal scheme on the one hand, where 
differences are placed within particular hierarchies depending on the model being used; or a 
culturally relative exoticism, on the other, which reifies and privileges difference. Connected 
histories and connected sociologies, together with a recognition of „international 
interconnectedness‟, allows for the deconstruction of dominant narratives at the same time 
as being open to different perspectives and seeks to reconcile them systematically both in 
terms of the reconstruction of theoretical categories and in the incorporation of new data 
and evidence. This is the promise of historical sociology  truly global and for our times  
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